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Could the Cyrenaics Live an Ethical Life?
Jules Vuillemin’s Answer
(and a Further Suggestion)
Ugo Zilioli
Durham University (UK)
Résumé : Cet article s’attache à comprendre si les cyrénaïques étaient sus-
ceptibles d’être attaqués moyennant l’objection d’inactivité et, si oui, comment
ils auraient pu essayer d’y répondre et quel type de vision morale ils auraient
pu essayer de défendre. En traitant de ces questions, j’évaluerai la légitimité
de l’interprétation du scepticisme cyrénaïque offerte par Jules Vuillemin. Je
confirmerai ainsi la plausibilité de son interprétation et développerai en même
temps l’exploration de la nature et de la portée de la philosophie cyrénaïque.
Abstract: The paper aims to first understand whether the Cyrenaics were
actually susceptible to the charge of apraxia; secondly, if they were, to see how
they might have responded to this and what sort of ethical outlook they might
have tried to defend. In dealing with these issues, I will inevitably assess the
legitimacy of Vuillemin’s interpretation of Cyrenaic scepticism. In so doing, I
shall confirm the scholarly plausibility of his interpretation while, at the same
time, providing material for further exploration of the full nature and scope
of Cyrenaic philosophy.
Pyrrho led a life consistent with this doctrine, going out of his
way for nothing, taking no precaution, but facing all risks as they
came, whether carts, precipices, dogs or what not, and, generally,
leaving nothing to the arbitrament of the senses; but he was kept
out of harm’s way by his friends who, as Antigonus of Carystus
tells us, used to follow close after him. But Aenesidemus says
that it was only his philosophy that was based upon suspension
of judgement, and that he did not lack foresight in his everyday
acts. He lived to be nearly ninety. [Diogenes Laertius, 9.62]
Philosophia Scientiæ, 20(3), 2016, 29–48.
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In the second part of his article on the morality of the sceptic, “Une
morale est-elle compatible avec le scepticisme?”, the French philosopher Jules
Vuillemin asks whether an ethical life is ever possible for the Cyrenaics
[Vuillemin 1985, 25–35]. How will it be possible for the Cyrenaics and, for
that matter, for any brand of sceptics to have an ethical life at all if scepticism
lacks a criterion of truth, that is, a measure against which one has to choose
what actions should be taken or avoided, asks Vuillemin.
As we all know, Vuillemin’s question is an ancient one for the sceptics of all
sorts, one that has been put in quite different ways and has been answered in
different ways too, both in ancient and in modern times.1 The quotation from
Diogenes Laertius on Pyrrho which appears as the epigraph to the present
paper shows how the apraxia objection has been with scepticism since its very
birth. Cicero formulates the apraxia challenge in a way I find particularly
illuminating, at least for the purpose of the present paper. He does so by
referring to the context of Stoic thinking on the subject, since the Stoics
were the ancient philosophers who developed the apraxia argument against
the sceptics at its fullest extent [Plutarch, Against Colotes, 1122a]. I report
Cicero’s passage from the Academica in full:
We must first have an impression of what moves our impulse, and
believe it, and that can’t happen if the object of our impression
can’t be discriminated from something false. So how can the mind
be moved to have an impulse if it doesn’t apprehend whether the
object is suited to our nature or alien to it? Similarly, if no action
strikes our mind as appropriate, it will never act at all, never be
stirred to do anything, never be moved. But if we’re ever going to
perform any action the impression we have must strike us as true.
[Cicero, On Academic Scepticism, 2.25, Brittain’s translation]
In the passage Cicero employs the vocabulary of the Stoics and speaks
of impression and assent; yet the philosophical point he addresses is related
to Vuillemin’s: how could the sceptic act if he weren’t equipped with a
valid criterion of truth that would ultimately allow him to discern truth
from falsehood? The apraxia challenge grows almost naturally from the
epistemological views of the sceptics—both Cicero and Vuillemin highlight
the point. But Vuillemin argues that, like other sceptics, the Cyrenaics can
meet the apraxia challenge and that, even on the basis of their subjective
epistemology, they cannot only develop an original form of hedonistic theory,
but also give it a practical application.2
1. On the different versions of the apraxia challenge, it is useful to see [Vogt 2010,
165–180, esp. 166], where she lists six different, yet not exhaustive, versions of the
apraxia charge. For a magisterial treatment of the apraxia challenge, see [Burnyeat
2012], see also [Perin 2010, 86–113].
2. For a recent solution to the apraxia charge when levelled against the Cyrenaics,
see [Lampe 2015, 56–91], where much emphasis is put on the limits of Cyrenaic
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Now, what I propose to do in the subsequent sections of the present
contribution is, first, to understand whether, like mainstream sceptics, the
Cyrenaics too were actually susceptible to the apraxia charge; and second,
if they were, to see how they might have responded to it and what sort
of ethical outlook they might have tried to defend.3 In dealing with these
issues, I will inevitably become involved in assessing the legitimacy and
cogency of Vuillemin’s interpretation of Cyrenaic scepticism; in so doing, I
shall confirm the scholarly plausibility of his interpretation while, at the same
time, providing material for further exploration of the full nature and scope of
Cyrenaic philosophy. At the end, I shall suggest that the Cyrenaics were not
only in a theoretical position to develop an ethics but also that their ethics
is more wide-ranging and complex than usually believed (one that accords an
important role in human life to happiness as well as pleasure).
1 The Cyrenaics on pleasure, knowledge
and the apraxia charge
At first sight, it might seem misleading to ask whether the Cyrenaics were in
a position to have an ethics. Diogenes Laertius places the Cyrenaic school as
one of the ten main ethical schools of antiquity [DL, I, 18]. The key aspect
of the philosophical outlook of the Cyrenaic school is that pleasure is the
end of life; that is, the Cyrenaics held a quite substantial form of hedonism
that, by making pleasure the kernel of moral life, seemed to have put them in
contrast with ancient eudaimonism.4 The main source for the reconstruction of
Cyrenaic hedonism is Diogenes Laertius’s Life of Aristippus [DL, II, 65–104]:5
He [Aristippus] proclaimed as the end the smooth motion resulting
in perception. [DL, II, 85]
They [the Cyrenaics] said there are two kinds of affection, plea-
sure and pain, the former a smooth, the latter a rough motion.
[DL, II, 86]
“presentism” (I shall return to Lampe’s interpretation in section 5 of the present
paper).
3. A specification at this point may be useful for the reader: following Vuillemin, in
the paper I constantly link the apraxia challenge with the actual possibility of ethics.
What is being investigated is the possibility of rational action for the Cyrenaics; that
is, of an action that, in being rational, provides the theoretical ground for a shared
ethics. When I deal with the apraxia challenge for the Cyrenaics throughout the
paper, the emphasis is thus put on the possibility of a shared, ethical framework for
actions in the context of their thinking, and not on the possibility of action for the
agent tout court.
4. On the topic, see [Irwin 1991], [O’Keefe 2002] and more recently [Lampe 2015];
I shall deal with the whole question in the final section of the paper, p. 42.
5. All translations are my own, otherwise stated.
32 Ugo Zilioli
Other sources such as Cicero, Aristocles of Messene, Sextus and Athenaeus
confirm the extent to which the Cyrenaics were interested in hedonism, as
well as providing further details about it. In particular, Sextus shows how
the Cyrenaics linked pleasure with a kind of corresponding physiological
modification or alteration in our body:
Cyrenaic doctrine differs from scepticism in so much as it says that
the end is pleasure and the smooth motion of the flesh. [Sextus,
PH, I, 215]
Lastly, Athenaeus gives us information on another important feature of
Cyrenaic hedonism: the momentary, transitory aspect of pleasure. He says:
The Cyrenaic school began with Aristippus the Socratic; having
approved of the affection of pleasure, he claimed that pleasure
is the end of life, and that happiness is based on it. He added
that pleasure occupies one temporal unit [is monochronon], since
he believed, as profligates do, that neither the memory of past
enjoyments nor the expectation of future ones were important for
him. Judging the good in light of the present alone, he considered
what he enjoyed in the past and will enjoy in the future not to be
important for him, the former because it exists no more, the latter
because it does not yet exist and is not manifest. [Atheaneus,
Deipnosophists, 12.544a]
The Cyrenaics, thus, did propose a well-defined ethics. According to them,
pleasure is the ethical goal of human life; as such, every human being should
look for it. The Cyrenaics also conceived of pleasure as having a physiological
source and as being a momentary event. One may then ask what sort of
epistemology lies behind this ethics. In order to assess the legitimacy of the
apraxia charge if levelled against them, we shall need to discuss whether the
Cyrenaics endorsed a kind of epistemology that, being sceptical, cut them off
from the theoretical possibility of having an ethics.
The theory of truth the Cyrenaics adopted is highly original; it may be
conveniently termed as an epistemology of affections [pathê].6 Central to it is
the idea that when we know something, we are affected in certain ways. For
instance, if I see the wall in front of me as white, there is surely an affection
of white produced by the wall in me. I cannot be mistaken about this, i.e.,
about seeing as white the wall that happens to be in front of me at this very
moment. On the other hand, what the Cyrenaics were keen to remark on, is
that, although we are surely not mistaken about how we are affected by things,
we can never know how things in themselves really are. I see the wall in front
of me as white; I cannot be mistaken about my seeing the wall as white; I
will never know whether the wall is really and actually white in itself. Sextus
6. For a full introduction to the main content and details of Cyrenaic epistemology,
see [Tsouna 1998], see also [Lampe 2015, chap. 3], and [Zilioli 2014, chap. 5].
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Empiricus, the richest source on Cyrenaic epistemology, provides us with key-
details, simultaneously introducing the neologisms the Cyrenaics invented to
express their epistemological views:
The Cyrenaics hold that affections are the criteria [of truth]
and that they alone are apprehended and are infallible. By
contrast, none of the things that have caused the affections
is apprehensible or infallible. They say that it is possible to
state infallibly and truly and firmly and incorrigibly that we are
being whitened or sweetened. It is not possible however to say
that the thing productive of our affections is white or sweet,
because one may be disposed whitely even by something that is
not-white or may be sweetened by something that is not-sweet.
[Sextus, M, VII, 191–192]
This is the reason why the Cyrenaics are thought of as sceptics: according
to them, we know how things are for us, not how things are in themselves.
Recently, I have disputed whether, on the basis of their epistemology, the
Cyrenaics are best understood as traditional sceptics. I have suggested
that the reason why they claimed that we know how things affect us, and
not things in themselves is not because of our epistemological limitations
but because of the nature of things. We can’t know how things are in
themselves not because we are epistemologically limited, but because things
in themselves are ontologically indeterminate, that is, they do not possess
any intrinsic ontological feature on their own.7 On my understanding, the
Cyrenaics are to be seen as sceptics but sceptics of a particular kind, that
is, of the same kind as Pyrrho, if we follow the metaphysical interpretation
of Pyrrho and his thought offered by Richard Bett.8 For present purposes,
however, the nature of Cyrenaic scepticism may be left aside: on both the
traditional interpretation and the metaphysical one, I advocate, the criterion
of truth for the Cyrenaics lies within the individual, that is, in the subject
performing the cognitive activity. Accordingly, on neither interpretation
is there an objective epistemological criterion that could ultimately work
as the shared measure of truth.
This being the case, on both interpretations the Cyrenaics are susceptible
of the apraxia charge: how will it be possible to have a criterion of rational
action (and so, a shared ethics) if there is no common criterion of truth (namely
a criterion that is shared as such by all the members of the community)?
If you and I cannot even agree whether the honey we are eating at the
7. [Zilioli 2014, 75–100], [Zilioli 2015], to be read in contrast with [O’Keefe 2015].
8. Two alternative interpretations of Pyrrho’s scepticism have been recently of-
fered, one epistemological, the other metaphysical. For a sketch of the two rival
interpretations, see section 2 of Corti’s contribution to the present volume, p. 10–
13; the metaphysical interpretation is championed by [Bett 1999]. It is worth noting,
however, that, although he thinks my interpretation of the Cyrenaics as metaphysical
indeterminists is in principle plausible, Bett does not agree with it [Bett 2015].
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moment is really sweet, how could we ever agree to put it with the cheese
and offer it to the guests coming later tonight? Since we don’t have a
shared criterion about the sweetness of the honey, we can’t have a shared idea
about how to act. Thus, the Cyrenaics can indeed be charged with apraxia,
as much as any other sceptic.9
The point I have just raised with the example of the honey and our
consequent inability to act under certain circumstances is illustrated with
greater philosophical acumen and elegance by Aristocles of Messene, who offers
a throughout and pervasive criticism of the doctrines of the Cyrenaics. First
of all, he sums up the Cyrenaic view on affections in the following way:
Next would be those who say that affections alone are apprehen-
sible. This view was adopted by some of the philosophers from
Cyrene. As if oppressed by a kind of torpor, they maintained that
they knew nothing at all, unless someone beside them struck and
pricked them. They said that, when burnt or cut, they knew that
they were affected by something. But whether the thing which is
burning them is fire, or that which cut them is iron, they could
not tell. [Aristocles apud Eusebius, PE, XIV, 19, 1]
Aristocles explains how the epistemology of the Cyrenaics ultimately forced
them to be detached from the world: namely, that it prevented them from
saying anything about the identity of the material objects causing the affec-
tions in them. The real threat of solipsism and inactivity seems here to hang
menacingly over the Cyrenaics: how could a Cyrenaic decide to cut a cake
if he weren’t even able to establish whether it was a cake that was causing
an affection of sweetness in him at that moment? Aristocles, once again,
presses the point:
The man who has an affection certainly apprehends whether he is
affected by an affection of something familiar or unfamiliar. How
will he be able to say that this is pleasure and that pain? Or that
he is affected, when he is tasting, or seeing or hearing? Or that he
9. It has been objected (by George Boys-Stones in personal conversation) that,
after all, the Cyrenaics had a norm for action, namely the particular pleasure of the
moment. Accordingly, they shouldn’t have been bothered by the apraxia charge. My
aim in the paper is to show why the Cyrenaics thought ethical action (issuing in
pleasure) to be perfectly compatible with their philosophical outlook. As said earlier
(note 3, p. 31), the emphasis in the present paper is, however, on shared criteria for
rational action. For the Cyrenaics pleasure is undoubtedly the criterion for action.
Yet, the (epistemological) way the single Cyrenaic comes to terms with pleasure
cannot be private. Although he privately feels his pleasure and can be truly said
to own it in a way that others don’t, the Cyrenaic knows that he feels pleasure by
means of a shared epistemological standard (for more details on this argument, see
[Zilioli 2014, 131–147]). Were this the case, pleasure (even the particular pleasure of
the moment) would provide for the Cyrenaics the ground for their ethics, namely a
shared criterion for pleasurable actions (though individually felt as such).
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is tasting with his tongue, seeing with his eyes and hearing with
his ears? Or how do they know that we ought to choose this and
avoid that? If they do not know any of these things they will not
have impulses or desires and would not be living beings. They are
ridiculous when they say that things happened to them but they
do not know how and in which way. That way they could not say
whether they were human beings or even alive. [Aristocles apud
Eusebius, PE, XIV, 19, 5]
On the one hand, then, we have the Cyrenaics proposing a quite strong form of
hedonism: strong enough for it to give ground recently to the claim that they
are the first serious hedonists in the history of thought, or at least Western
thought.10 On the other hand, serious concerns were raised even in antiquity
as whether, theoretically speaking, the Cyrenaics could even propose, let
alone defend, that hedonism or, for that matter, any ethical theory. Were
the Cyrenaics aware of the possible conflict between their epistemology of
affections and their ethical outlook? No extant source that I am aware of
tells us whether they were actually concerned about the apraxia charge. I
suggest, however, that they were not so lacking in philosophical acumen as to
be unconscious of any potential clash between their epistemological doctrines
on the one hand and their hedonism on the other. What I propose is that they
held their hedonism to be quite consistent with their epistemology; in their
own view, their theory left agents perfectly capable of acting ethically.
2 The Theaetetus: the subtler thinkers
To assess the legitimacy of my proposal we need to explore the philosophy of
the Cyrenaics a little further. I propose to do this by looking briefly at the
Theaetetus. I choose the Theaetetus for two main reasons, one slighter, and
the other more profound. I single out the Theaetetus first because I follow
Vuillemin’s suggestion that the subtler thinkers named in that dialogue are
best understood as Cyrenaic. A scrutiny of the evidence provided by this
part of the Theaetetus—Vuillemin proposes—shows us the actual reasons why
the Cyrenaics had no conceptual problems in defending a well-defined ethical
outlook, despite the potentially threatening consequences of their subjective
epistemology.11 The second reason for considering the Theaetetus relevant
10. See [Lampe 2015, esp. 3–9, 26–91, 193–197], which offers much material to
support Cicero’s view that the Cyrenaics were the first hedonists in Greek thought:
“When Epicurus said that pleasure is the highest good, on the one hand he did not
fully understand that idea; on the other, that idea is not his own: before him and in
a better way, that idea was of Aristippus” [Fin., 1.8.26].
11. See [Vuillemin 1985, 26–27, esp. 27]: “Pour acquiescer à cette classification de
nos impressions, il suffit d’être attentif aux données immédiates et aux apparences
sans avoir à invoquer, avec le Socrate platonicien [that is, the Socrates of the
Theaetetus], l’opinion ou la vérité”.
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to our current purposes is that the section of the subtler thinkers in that
dialogue (namely [Tht., 156a3–157c1]) provides us with a further challenge
the Cyrenaics would have had to meet in squaring their epistemology with the
possibility of action in everyday life.
In my view it takes little effort to accept Vuillemin’s claim that there is a
Cyrenaic substratum in Plato’s Theaetetus. Vuillemin is, I think, quite right
about this. In line with other scholars in the past, but in contrast with more
recent interpreters, I have myself defended an identical view to Vuillemin’s.12
The matter remains controversial; my aim here is not to dig deeper into it but
rather to explore a key section of the Theaetetus with an eye to the problem
we have been facing in this paper, namely, the extent to which the Cyrenaics
may have been charged with apraxia and the possible solution they may have
provided to answer that charge.
As we all know, the Theaetetus is about the nature and content of
knowledge. At a crucial point in the first part of the dialogue where,
following Protagoras’ lead, knowledge is defined as perception, Socrates refers
to some subtler thinkers who, on his account, have developed at a fuller extent
Protagoras’ Secret Doctrine, earlier announced by Socrates himself.13 Central
to that doctrine and to the views of the subtler thinkers is the crucial idea
that everything is motion and is in motion. As Socrates puts it:
Their starting point [of the subtler thinkers], on which hangs
everything we were talking about just now, was that everything
was change and that there was nothing besides change;14 and of
change there were two kinds, each unlimited in plurality but with
12. The main scholarly attempt to reject the identification between the subtler
thinkers of the Theaetetus and the Cyrenaics is to be found in [Tsouna 1998, 124–
137]. Tsouna’s central argument for that rejection lies in the philosophical contrast
she sees between Protagoras’ relativism and Cyrenaic subjectivism. There are surely
differences between the views endorsed by Protagoras and the Cyrenaics, but the
affinities between them are highlighted both in antiquity and in modern times: see
[Rowe 2015], which offers a quite sophisticated attempt to deal with the Cyrenaic
presence in that dialogue. Mainly in contrast with [Tsouna 1998, 124–136], [Zilioli
2013] aims to show the reasons why the subtler thinkers are best understood as the
early Cyrenaics.
13. “I’ll tell you a theory that certainly ought not to be written off. It’s to the
effect that actually nothing is just one thing, itself by itself, and that you cannot
refer to a thing correctly by any description whatever. If you call something big, it
will appear as small as well, and if you call it heavy, it will appear as light too; and
similarly with everything, just because—so the theory says—nothing is one, whether
a one something or a one any sort of thing. If we say, of anything, that it is, we’re
wrong, because in fact all things are in process of coming to be through motion, and
change in general, and mixture with each other; nothing ever is, it’s always coming
to be” [Plato, Tht., 152d2–e1, Rowe’s translation]. Protagoras’ Secret Doctrine is
the sort of metaphysical position Socrates (and Plato) sees as most compatible with
Protagoras’ epistemological relativism (as this has been stated at [Tht., 152a ff.]).
14. A central tenet of Protagoras’ Secret Doctrine (the other main fundamental
tenet being that nothing is one thing, itself by itself). In the first lines of the quotation,
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different powers, one to act, the other to be acted upon. From
the coming together of these two kinds of motion, and the friction
of one against the other, offspring come into being—unlimited
numbers of them, but twins in every case, one twin being what is
perceived, the other a perception, emerging simultaneously with
what is perceived and being generated along with it. Well, for the
perceptions we possess names such as seeing, hearing, smelling,
cooling down or burning up, ones we call pleasures and pains,
too, desires and fears, and others besides—an unlimited number
that lack names as well as a huge range that are named. [Plato,
Tht., 156a4–b7, Rowe’s translation]
According to the subtler thinkers’ theory, there are two kinds of motion that,
in coming together and rubbing one against another, produce a vast array of
twin-births, namely what is perceived, on the one hand, and the perception
itself on the other. In expounding the peculiar theory of perception endorsed
by the subtler thinkers, Socrates is keen to use the term “perception”, which
we have to understand in a sense broad enough to include what nowadays
we label as “sensations”. Pleasure and pain, the two key-notions of Cyrenaic
ethics, unmentioned so far in the Theaetetus, are now included in the list of
perceptions Socrates offers while illustrating the subtler thinkers’ theory.15
The main philosophical features of that theory are actually identical with
those of the Cyrenaic doctrine of affections, as we know it from those other
sources (e.g., Sextus Empiricus) we have previously encountered (see above,
p. 31–33). For the Cyrenaics as well as for the subtler thinkers, when I see a
wall as white, there is a strictly private, epistemologically un-transferable, and
momentary linkage between myself (more precisely, my mind) and the outer
world. I cannot be mistaken about the wall that happens to be in front of me
at the moment appearing to me as white. On the same basis, if I drink my
tea after a wet walk, I will be able to feel pleasure and I cannot be mistaken
about this—again, my feeling of pleasure being private, unfelt by others (who
may feel pleasure while drinking the same tea, but not “my” own pleasure),16
and time-limited.
3 Vuillemin on the Theaetetus
Given the close conceptual affinities between the Cyrenaic doctrine of affec-
tions and the section on the subtler thinkers of Plato’s Theaetetus, Vuillemin
argues not only that the subtler thinkers actually represent the philosophical
views of Aristippus and the early Cyrenaics, but also that the theory the
Socrates sums up the core point of the Doctrine; in the rest, he will detail how the
subtler thinkers understand—and further develop—Protagoras’ Doctrine.
15. See [Plato, Tht., 156b4-6, Rowe’s translation], quoted above.
16. On the grammar of private sensations, see [Wittgenstein 1953, sec. 241–253].
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subtler thinkers are made to elaborate in the Theaetetus contains the main
answer the Cyrenaics may have offered to anyone challenging them with the
apraxia charge. As I have said, the conceptual features of their subjectivist
epistemology may well, at least in principle, make the Cyrenaics appear
susceptible to the apraxia charge. How could the Cyrenaics have an ethics (of
pleasure) and lead an ethical life at all if no objective criterion existed against
which they could assess the validity of their affections, be these affections
epistemological impressions or emotional responses? The solipsism potentially
inherent in Cyrenaic epistemology apparently traps the life of the Cyrenaic in
an insane inactivity.
Looking at the Theaetetus, Vuillemin argues that the theory of the subtler
thinkers does after all provide us with a potentially objective criterion against
which the Cyrenaics could measure their subjective affections: that is, move-
ment, or more precisely the greater or lesser intensity of movement.17 We have
seen that motion and change are central to the theory of the subtler thinkers,
as is the idea that motion and change are at the roots of our perceptual activity,
i.e., of the ways we come to terms with the outer world.18 Vuillemin’s point
is that a sort of classifications of our affections is possible for the Cyrenaics
exactly on the basis of a certain and objective classification of the movements
and alterations that give rise to those affections. Those movements and
alterations, having a sort of biological basis, are able to provide us with a kind
of extra-subjective criterion of assessment. There will thus be an effective and
reliable way for the Cyrenaics to discern among affections. Such a possibility,
in turn, will provide the Cyrenaics with an ethics, that is, with a sort of guide
for action that is valid beyond our mere subjective states and is valid for all
of us, since we all would be able to assess our own affections (of pleasure and
pain) on the biological basis of the movements and alterations occurring in us
while being affected, and we would thus be able to act accordingly.
If they could thus transcend the mere limits of their individual experiences,
that is, through the presence of an extra-affective criterion for actions to be
performed or avoided (on the basis of a scale of pleasures and pains), the
Cyrenaics would indeed be able to reflect on their own primary affections, thus
showing their epistemology capable of accommodating second-order types of
judgement. That there is room for epistemological activities that go beyond
17. See [Vuillemin 1985, 27–28]: “Mais si l’on se souvient de l’hypothèse minima
faite sur l’existence de préférences d’ailleurs privées de toute relation à des fondements
ou à des causes extérieures, si l’on précise que cette hypothèse avait pour conséquence
d’assimiler toute qualité sensible au double mouvement relatif du sentant et du
senti, on ne manquera pas d’opposer au principe de la classification des impressions
une classification des mouvements, étant entendu que ces mouvements sont de purs
phénomènes, qu’ils ne consistent que dans l’identification de la qualité sensible et
de la sensation, de l’agréable et du plaisir, du désagréable et de la douleur, sans
prétention aucune à représenter quelque nature ou quelque être objectif”.
18. As seen earlier (p. 31), the early Cyrenaics and Aristippus himself linked the
idea of affection with movement and alteration, [DL, II, 85–86].
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the mere affective, perceptual apprehension is something Vuillemin stresses in
his analysis of the apraxia challenge for the Cyrenaics, and rightly so;19 it
is an important point, and one that has usually been obscured in the classic
treatments of the Cyrenaics, though it has gained some traction in more recent
interpretations.20
I therefore believe that Vuillemin provides us—via the Theaetetus— with
a credible way of explaining why the Cyrenaics might have had no actual
problem with the apraxia charge, and might have gone to adopt a hedonistic
ethics: their epistemology was such as to allow them to have an ethics,
and one where pleasure plays a central role.21 Yet, I also think that the
decision to look at the Theaetetus to find possible answers to the apraxia
charge as levelled against the Cyrenaics takes the risks of that charge to
a further level of danger and complexity for them: a level that Vuillemin’s
analysis does not venture to explore, mostly because the Cyrenaics were just
one part of his overall analysis of how ancient sceptics may have responded
to the apraxia charge.
Two options now lie ahead for the reader: either to stop here and accept
Vuillemin’s quite reasonable account of why the Cyrenaics were not bothered
by the apraxia charge; or to read on as I try to explain the deepest challenge
that, on my view, the subtler thinkers’ doctrine provides for the Cyrenaic
theory of action, and investigate the possible response that the Cyrenaics
could have offered to that challenge.
4 The Theaetetus: a further challenge
After outlining the first details of the theory of the subtler thinkers (the
passage quoted earlier [Tht., 156a4–b7]) to Theaetetus, Socrates proposes to
explore the full content and the important philosophical implications of that
theory. He does so by sketching a quite detailed picture of how perception
works according to the subtler thinkers and indicates where such a theory
will lead them:22
19. [Vuillemin 1985, 28], where he stresses that the subtler thinkers of the
Theaetetus are able to judge on the greater or lesser intensity of pleasures and pains.
20. See [Lampe 2015, 35–45] and [Zilioli 2014, 122–129]. More particularly, I think
it is impossible to make sense of what Sextus says about the Cyrenaics on language
[M, VII, 196–198], if we refuse to allow that the Cyrenaics admitted second-order
types of judgments into their epistemology of affections (see [Zilioli 2014, 122–129],
with further reference to the Cyrenaic doctrine of “internal touch”).
21. Lampe, Tsouna and Zilioli have all insisted on the close conceptual linkage
between Cyrenaic ethics and epistemology (a linkage that has already surfaced in this
contribution), although with quite different emphases and philosophical motivations
[Lampe 2015], [Tsouna 1998] and [Zilioli 2014].
22. The passage I am about to quote is quite lengthy but I provide it almost in full,
given its philosophical significance for our own purposes here. I also think that the
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Nothing is, itself by itself, as we were saying before; rather, it
is in coming together with each other that all things and all
sorts of things come to be, from their changing. In fact it’s not
possible, they say, to get a stable fix, in the one case, even on
which of them is doing the acting and which is being acted upon,
for neither is there anything acting before it comes together with
what is acting [...]. The consequence of all this, according to the
theory is that nothing—as we were saying at the beginning—is
just one thing, itself by itself, but instead is always coming to be
in relation to something [...]. Our utterances should conform to
nature and have things “coming to be”, “being made”, “passing
away” and “altering”, since if anyone ever uses language that
brings something to a stop, he lays himself open to challenge.
The rule applies to talk both about the individual case and about
many grouped together—the sort of grouping for which people
posit “man” and “stone”, and so on for each animal and each
kind of thing. [Tht., 157a1–c1, Rowe’s translation]
What is, then, the final outcome of the subtler thinkers’ theory? It is that
we cannot actually name material items such as objects and persons because
these are not, actually speaking, what we usually take them to be. They
are best understood as bundles that keep changing all the time, with no
determinate or uniquely established essence. In fact, according to the subtler
thinkers’ theory, nothing is one thing over time, everything being in a perennial
process of change.
Let us focus on persons: Socrates sick is different from healthy Socrates,
so there is not one real Socrates, but a series of different Socrateses who have,
ontologically speaking, little in common.23 And this is the dangerous point
Plato has in mind, when he makes Socrates draw out the full implications of
the subtler thinkers’ theory: the world as depicted by the subtler thinkers is
just a vast array of processes, fully deprived of ontologically stable items, such
as persons and objects as we usually conceive of them. But if this is so, what
kind of persons will there be in such a world? It really seems that persons in
that world are so evanescent as to evaporate altogether. But if there are no
actual people, at least in the usual way we know and talk of people, in the
world of the subtler thinkers (that is, in the Cyrenaic world if we believe, as
I believe along with Vuillemin, that the subtler thinkers are actually putting
forward Cyrenaic views), how on Earth could an ethics be developed and an
ethical life lived in such a world?
Vuillemin recognizes the threat of inactivity in the epistemology of af-
fections endorsed by the Cyrenaics and finds a response to that threat in
passage hasn’t received yet the full attention it requires. Obviously enough, it is by
commenting on this passage that I bring in the notion of metaphysical indeterminacy,
see [Zilioli 2014, chap. 4].
23. For the example of the two Socrateses, see [Plato, Tht., 159b-c].
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the theory of the subtler thinkers, as elaborated in the Theaetetus. On
my understanding, that theory builds up that sort of epistemology but in
the process it lays itself open to that threat again at the deeper level of
metaphysics, that is, at the level of the material outlook on the world that
lies behind that epistemology. The apraxia charge is thus in principle levelled
against the Cyrenaics not only because their epistemology prevent them—at
least on some interpretations—from picking out a distinctive, objective and
shared criterion of action, but also because the metaphysics somehow implicit
in that epistemology appears to dispense not only with material objects but
also with agents, at least with agents displaying an identity over time. And
if there are no actual subjects in the world, there will be no action, or at any
rate only a fragmentary one, that is, a kind of evanescent action that could
not possibly be the concern of any ethics.
One may retort that the deeper threat for the Cyrenaics as posed by
the metaphysical commitments implicit in the theory of the subtler thinkers
will be there if the subtler thinkers do in fact represent Cyrenaic views,
and this is disputable, as we have seen: so, then, we shall be in a securer
position if we simply leave these further commitments out. Yet, although
there is no scholarly consensus on the actual identity of the subtler thinkers
of Plato’s Theaetetus, I think, together with Vuillemin and others, that there
are quite good reasons for taking the views the subtler thinkers advance in the
Theaetetus to be Cyrenaic. And, in any case, even if we judge that there are
no compelling reasons for supposing that the subtler thinkers represent the
Cyrenaics of the first-generation, the Cyrenaics will still be faced with similar
objections from other sources.
Other sources than Plato’s Theaetetus do in fact raise the same problem
for the Cyrenaics. Aristocles already hints at it in the passage quoted above,
when he says that, on the basis of the epistemology they endorse, the Cyrenaics
will not be able to discern between pleasure and pain, and will not have any
real desires: in short, they “could not say whether they were human beings or
even alive”. Aristocles presses the point further, when he remarks:
It cannot be the case that, if someone is for example warm, one
will know that one is being warmed without knowing whether it
is himself or a neighbour, now or last year, in Athens or Egypt,
someone alive or dead, a man or a stone. One will therefore know
too what one is affected by, for people know one another and the
roads, the cities, the food they eat. [Aristocles apud Eusebius,
PE, XIV, 19, 3]
As has been noted (see [O’Keefe 2015, 101–102]), Aristocles’ main point in
the passage seems to be epistemological: the Cyrenaics cannot know whether
it is they that are warmed or someone else, whether they are in Egypt or in
Athens, or whether they are human beings or not. As I have argued elsewhere,
Aristocles’ remark in conjunction with other sources implies a metaphysical
message, the essence of which is that the Cyrenaics are involved in denying that
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material things in the world, including persons, lack any stable or determinate
essence, see [Zilioli 2014, 83–100, 109–113], [Zilioli 2015].
There is, therefore, a credible case for saying that the Cyrenaics would
have been confronted with the threat of apraxia brought up at the level of
metaphysics. Together with other material items, persons in the Cyrenaic
world are too evanescent and time-limited to be the subjects of any ethical
systems.24 How then could the Cyrenaics respond to the new, more radical
threat of apraxia posed by their own conception of the material world? In
answering the question, we will be brought face to face with the originality of
Cyrenaic ethics, which will prove to be an original ethics not only of pleasure
but also of happiness. My account here will confront, and contrast, two
different accounts of Cyrenaic ethics: one, more familiar, offered by Terry
Irwin, and a more recent account provided by Kurt Lampe.
5 Pleasure, happiness and the self
How vulnerable are the Cyrenaics to Socrates’ criticism that in the world of
the subtler thinkers material items (such as persons, as we usually conceive of
them) will disappear? Terry Irwin has claimed that the Cyrenaics are the only
true exception to Greek eudaimonism, exactly because they lack a conception
of the self as a sort of extended and stable entity over time. The Cyrenaics
were interested in the particular pleasure of the moment just because they
lack such a concept of the self. Their ethics is thus perfectly summed up in
their strict, perhaps crude, hedonism: if there is no stable self in the Cyrenaic
world, there will be no actual way for the Cyrenaics to be interested in—or,
for accounting for—happiness, since happiness requires a somehow stable and
enduring subject to be fully enjoyed.25
At least at a first sight, there is no such requirement for the enjoyment
of pleasure. Subject S1 may have a pleasure P1 at a time T1; subject S1 is
not there any longer at a time T2, but it is perfectly reasonable for us to
say that S2 (which is different from S1) will feel a pleasure P2 at time T2.
There is a series of subjects at different times, each subject being a different
subject from the preceding subject as well as from any subsequent one,
all these subjects enjoying different pleasures at their different times. The
particular pleasure of the moment is thus the only possible ethical end for
ever-changing subjects, since there is no actual way for them to go beyond
the narrow limits of their transient and temporary existence in the way
possibly needed to enjoy happiness.
24. Nick Pappas has objected to me that, after all, there is no need of a stable
self for the very possibility of action. He may be right. There is however surely
the need—at least this is what I claim—of a relatively stable agent for the actual
possibility of rational action (and, hence, for a shared ethics).
25. See [Irwin 1991, 61]. The same view on the Cyrenaics is reaffirmed by Irwin in
his more recent history of ethics [Irwin 2007, 44–48].
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This is, in very general terms, the kind of hedonism Irwin attributes to the
Cyrenaics. Now, while I think that Irwin’s interpretation has some strengths,
such as pointing out that the Cyrenaic conception of the self, thus construed,
is quite different from the classical, standard one, it nevertheless has a major
drawback. Irwin’s reading cannot explain the fact that the reports about the
Cyrenaics in our ancient sources make reference to happiness. For example,
the passage of Athenaeus quoted above explicitly says that Aristippus claimed
that pleasure is the end of life, and that happiness is based on it. There are
also two relevant passages in Diogenes Laertius that clearly show happiness to
be relevant in the context of Cyrenaic ethics.
The two passages in question, both of which occur in Diogenes’ treatment
of the Cyrenaics [DL, II, 65–104], are as follows:
The end is not the same as happiness, since the end is particular
pleasure, whereas happiness is a collection made out of particular
pleasures. Among these both past and future pleasures are
counted together. Particular pleasure is desirable because of itself.
On the other hand, happiness is desirable not because of itself, but
because of the particular pleasures. [DL, II, 87–88]
There are things productive of certain pleasures that are often
of painful nature and are the opposite of pleasure, so that the
accumulation of pleasures that does not produce happiness is
difficult.26 [DL, II, 90]
I do not see how Irwin’s interpretation can explain these passages, which
display the Cyrenaics and Aristippus combining their hedonism with a clear
concern for happiness. Exactly how they are to be combined is not an easy
question; the more recent interpretation provided by Kurt Lampe in his
very instructive book on the Cyrenaics [Lampe 2015] does not in my view
offer any more satisfactory answer than Irwin. Lampe’s interpretation is in
many respects opposite to Irwin’s. Lampe claims that the Cyrenaics did not
question the standard concept of the self: like everyone else, they believed
in a stable self that has extended existence over time. (In claiming this,
Lampe rejects the Platonic evidence of Plato’s Theaetetus, rejecting the claim
that the subtler thinkers represent Cyrenaic views). Since they adopted a
classical view on the self, their ethics will be able to include reference to
happiness: somehow or other there will be an ontologically stable subject
who, among all the particular pleasures he will be enjoying, will also be able
to concern himself with happiness.
26. The text at [DL, II, 90] is disputed, some reading “the accumulation of pleasures
that produces happiness is difficult”. In the excellent critical edition of Diogenes’ Lives
[Dorandi 2013], ad locum, the text adopted is the one I have given in translation.
The conceptual point is, I take it, that for the Cyrenaics the difficulty lies in the
accumulation of pleasures that does not produce happiness, since accumulating
pleasures (whatever painful causes they may have), is in itself a production of
happiness.
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I have written elsewhere about the strengths and weaknesses of Lampe’s
interpretation, see [Zilioli 2015]; for our present purposes, I will confine myself
to highlighting that I am in full agreement with Lampe in thinking the kind
of hedonism as endorsed by the Cyrenaics to be perfectly compatible with
a sort of eudaimonism. Yet, if one is genuinely a hedonist—and, as Lampe
argues, the Cyrenaics were surely the first serious hedonists in the tradition of
Western thought—one will have to conceive of happiness as a quite secondary,
derivative aim in one’s practical life. The ethical focus in the life of the hedonist
is on pleasure, not on happiness. Given the sort of hedonism they appear to
have endorsed, for the Cyrenaics the kind of pleasure that is the main focus of
their ethical theory is the short-lived, uni-temporal pleasure of the moment.
Lampe tends to downplay the feature of uni-temporality as attached to the
Cyrenaic concept of pleasure because he thinks there is room in the ancient
texts for doing so [Lampe 2015, 56–91], whilst he thinks it is equally credible
to grant the Cyrenaics a long-term interest in less evanescent items in one’s
life such as, for instance, friendship [Lampe 2015, 92–100].
The full acceptance of happiness into their ethics has therefore to be
explained in light of the emphasis the Cyrenaics placed on pleasure. Lampe’s
own explanation seems to give both pleasure and happiness almost the same
degree of importance in Cyrenaic ethics. Although he sees the way the
Cyrenaics conceived of happiness as always (whether implicitly or explicitly)
bringing in pleasure, Lampe’s explanation of the value the Cyrenaics put on
long-term values such as friendship, benefaction and so on seems liable to
reduce their theory to a theory based on happiness, not on pleasure.
In other words, while Irwin attributes too little importance—if any—to
happiness in Cyrenaic ethics, treating the Cyrenaics as exclusively concerned
with the particular pleasures of the moment, Lampe puts too much emphasis
on happiness and long-term values, too little on the role of uni-temporal
pleasure. There is, however, in my view, a third possible way of looking at the
whole question: one that both retains the focus of Cyrenaic thinking on the
particular pleasure of the moment and at the same time accords an important
role to happiness.
The two last passages of Diogenes Laertius quoted above (that is, [DL, II,
87–88, 90]) make the particular pleasure of the moment central to Cyrenaic
ethics, and likewise both insist—as I think they should—on the secondary
importance of happiness. Happiness is defined as a “collection” [sustêma] of
particular pleasures or as an “accumulation” [athroisma] of pleasures. Both
terms, sustêma and athroisma, in the philosophical lexicon of Ancient Greeks
refer to a compound of parts, but with the emphasis always on the parts rather
than on the compound [LSJ, s.v.]. In Aristotle and in Epicurus, for instance,
athroisma always refers to something that is to be understood as the mere sum
of its parts and cannot be viewed as a proper whole displaying an essential
ontological unity, see [Arist., Generation of Animals, 4.8.77b30], [Epicurus,
Letter to Herodotus, 56, 62, 69]. The term refers to what we nowadays would
call “bundles” of parts or properties, that is, to something that, metaphysically
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speaking, is just an aggregate of parts lacking a well-unified and definite
structure.
Diogenes could scarcely have used a better term to explain the linkage
between pleasure and happiness in the context of Cyrenaic ethics; I think, in
fact, that he does not only report their view accurately but uses their actual
wording. Happiness is to be seen as an aggregate of pleasures, the Cyrenaics
claimed, because what matters to the picture is the actual parts of which
happiness is to be compounded, that is, particular pleasures. Happiness is
not for the Cyrenaics a well-defined whole, something over and above the
sum of its parts. It is best seen as a loose aggregate of its parts, which are
somehow more essential in their singular peculiarity than the whole that is
composed from them.
If the interpretation I suggest is viable, the Cyrenaics can indeed be
taken as retaining the core of their pioneering hedonism, while allowing for
happiness as a derivative, as a secondary aim of their ethics. Interestingly
enough, the term athroisma is used in the Theaetetus exactly in the section
of the subtler thinkers and, more importantly, in the part of that section
where Socrates forces them to face the unpalatable metaphysical consequence
of their theory. Socrates warns us that what we call “man” or “stone” will
be best seen as an aggregate [athroisma] of parts, if one adopts the theory of
the subtler thinkers.27
This brings us back to Lampe, Irwin and the topic of the self. Denying
the Cyrenaics any concern for happiness, Irwin claimed that they had no
conception of the self as subsisting over time. By contrast, Lampe claimed to
show that happiness matters for the Cyrenaics, while leaving them conceive
of the self as a stable and enduring entity over time. My own interpretation
which has the Cyrenaics mainly concerned on pleasure but also with a clear
commitment to happiness brings with it a conception of the self that refuses to
be “all or nothing”, to use Parfit’s expressions in the ever illuminating section
on personal identity of Reasons and Persons [Parfit 1984, part III].
In Parfit’s view, the question of identity of persons through time has
been traditionally conceived as having a definite answer. As for the positive
approach, we are the same person over time, despite the inevitable and
undeniable changes we undergo, because there are either psychological or
physical criteria allowing us to say that our identity through time is preserved.
Alternatively, we can’t be seen as the same person over time because there is
no definite criterion guaranteeing the preservation of our identity. On this
account, personal identity is therefore an all-or-nothing view.
Parfit refuses to adopt the traditional approach; he claims that what
matters is not personal identity but a more essential relation R, which is
27. “The rule applies to talk both about the individual case and about many
grouped together—the sort of grouping [athroismati] for which people posit ‘man’
and ‘stone’, and so on for each animal and each kind of thing” [Plato, Tht., 157b9–
c1, Rowe’s translation].
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broadly defined as a sort of loose psychological connectedness or continuity
between different selves or persons. Relation R links together all the different
kinds of persons we happen to be in the kind of life we lead. According to
Parfit, the person I am today is different both from the person I was yesterday
and also from the person I will be tomorrow; there is no psychological or
physical criterion that will ultimately allow me to say that, despite all the
changes I undergo, I am the same person over time. My personal identity is
thus not preserved. But, Parfit argues, personal identity is not what matters.
What really matters is that the different selves I am over time are R-
related; that is, these different selves are connected by a loose relation of
psychological connectedness or continuity. Differently from personal identity,
relation R is not an all-or-nothing view: despite lacking a criterion of identity
over time, relation R allows us to think of the different selves we are through
time as psychologically continuous, although not identical.28
To go back to the Cyrenaics: they could have explained the concurrence
of pleasure and happiness in their ethics if they had refused to adopt an all-
or-nothing conception of the self and had instead defended an idea of the self
as displaying a kind of connectedness, issuing in a sort of loose psychological
continuity over time. This sort of self enjoying this particular pleasure at
this particular time is different from the self that enjoyed another pleasure
yesterday and will also be different from the self that will enjoy another
pleasure tomorrow. Yet, although all these selves are actually different, they
are not totally different: there will be a relation of psychological connectedness
between them that will ultimately allow the subject composed by such diverse
selves to enjoy a sort of final happiness, that is, as Diogenes puts it, a happiness
that is best conceived of as the sum of all the particular pleasures enjoyed.
We have so far no extant evidence that the Cyrenaics actually held such
a Parfitian view of the self. But it is the only view, I claim, which would
have been theoretically tenable by the Cyrenaics if they wanted to include
28. This change of perspective is for Parfit truly refreshing: “When I believed
that my existence was such a further fact (that is, an all-or nothing view) I seemed
imprisoned in myself. My life seemed like a glass tunnel, through which I was moving
faster every year, and at the end of which there was darkness. When I changed my
view, the walls of my glass tunnel disappeared. I now live in the open air. There is still
a difference between my life and the lives of other people. But the difference is less.
Other people are closer. I am less concerned about the rest of my own life, and more
concerned about the lives of others”. A few other quotations from [Parfit 1984] will
help the reader; “I can now define two general relations: Psychological connectedness
is the holding of particular direct psychological connections; Psychological continuity
is the holding of overlapping chains of strong connectedness” [Parfit 1984, 206]; “Our
identity over time just involves (a) Relation (R)–psychological connectedness and/or
psychological continuity—with the right kind of cause” [Parfit 1984, 216]; “Personal
identity is not what matters. What fundamentally matters is Relation R, with any
cause. This relation is what matters even when, as in a case where one person is
R-related to two other people, relation R does not provide personal identity” [Parfit
1984, 217].
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a reference to happiness in their ethics, while also retaining the core of their
original hedonism. Ancient speculation on the self was quite developed29—and
it is not beyond the bounds of possibilities that one day evidence might be
found establishing that the Cyrenaics actually did hold the sort of Parfitian
view of the self I have attached to them. In any case, the Parfitian view
provides a solution for the Cyrenaics, namely the one they might have or
would have wanted to offer whether they actually thought of it or not. If
my reconstruction is correct, the metaphysical charge of apraxia levelled
by Socrates against the subtler thinkers of Plato’s Theaetetus, a.k.a. the
Cyrenaics—on both Vuillemin’s interpretation and mine—will not hold. A
subject there will be: one with a loose, fragmented identity, yet a suitable
subject for an ethics of pleasure with happiness in a secondary, subordinate,
but important role.
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